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Abstract
Purpose of Review South Asia is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, owing to the high dependency on climate-
sensitive livelihoods and recurrent extreme events. Consequently, an increasing number of households are adopting labour
migration as a livelihood strategy to diversify incomes, spread risks, and meet aspirations. Under the Collaborative Adaptation
Research Initiative in Africa and Asia (CARIAA) initiative, four research consortia have investigated migration patterns and their
inherent linkages to adaptation to climate change in climate hotspots. This article synthesizes key findings in regional context of
South Asia.
Recent Findings The synthesis suggests that in climate-sensitive hotspots, migration is an important livelihood diversification
strategy and a response to various risks, including climate change. Typically, one or more household members, often young men,
migrated internally or internationally to work in predominantly informal sectors. Remittances helped spatially diversify house-
hold income, spread risks, and insure against external stressors. The outcomes of migration are often influenced by who moves,
where to, and what capacities they possess.
Summary Migration was found to help improve household adaptive capacity, albeit in a limited capacity. Migration was mainly
used as a response to risk and uncertainty, but with potential to have positive adaptation co-benefits.
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The contemporary human world is becoming more mobile.
This movement of people, goods, services, and information
has reshaped our understanding of both spatial and temporal
dimensions of socioeconomic processes [4]. The impacts of
climate change including coastal flooding, erratic rainfall,
drought, riverbank erosion, and storm surges, combined with
other non-climatic drivers such as land use change, socioeco-
nomic shifts, and changes to gender norms, are likely to alter
the patterns of human migration further with a knock on effect
on immediate adaptation decisions at the household level [75].
Although climate change brings about a set of challenges at
the global level, in certain regions, its impact is likely to be
more severe because of higher exposure to climatic risks [58,
16, 28], deeper pre-existing structural vulnerabilities [97], and
comparatively lower adaptive capacity [48, 77]. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has iden-
tified such regions as climate change hotspots, defined as lo-
cations where impacts of climate change are well pronounced
and well documented [98]. For this paper, we expand this
definition to climate hotspots as “geographical area[s] where
a strong climate signal is combined with a large concentration
of vulnerable, poor or marginalized people” ([97]:784).
South Asia is home to several hotspots that are highly vul-
nerable to the effects of climate change [29, 53]. High depen-
dency on climate-sensitive livelihoods, such as fisheries and
agriculture, makes people living in coastal, river basin, and
semi-arid regions particularly vulnerable to the impacts of
climate variability and change [97]. South Asia experiences
recurrent natural hazards such as glacial lake outburst floods,
storm surges, droughts, cyclones, and heavy precipitation,
which is exacerbated by current and future climate change
[16, 47, 100]. As the livelihoods of people deteriorate, they
are displaced or are faced with an important decision: to mi-
grate (either the whole household or some of its members) or
adapt in situ.
South Asia is a socioeconomic and culturally heteroge-
neous region but there are important similarities among the
countries in terms of population density, development level,
poverty, and exclusion [51]. Population movement has been a
constant part of life in South Asia primarily as a strategy to
diversify and/or supplement income sources beyond
ecosystem-based forms of livelihood, but historically, migra-
tion in the region has been predominantly associated with
labour moves of semi-skilled and unskilled individuals to both
international and domestic destinations [39]. Migration trends
and patterns in South Asia are diverse but internal migration
outweighs international moves. Internal migration as a share
of total population is as high as 37% in India, 10% in
Bangladesh, 14% in Nepal, and 2% in Pakistan [83].
Although lower than internal migration, international moves
from this region are significant. For example, India,
Bangladesh, and Pakistan are among top ten emigration coun-
tries in the world and Nepal is the third largest recipient of
remittance as a share of GDP [106].
Although population movement in South Asia has histori-
cally been strongly associated with labour mobility [30, 80],
recent studies suggest that growing levels of rural to urban
migration in the region have been attributed to the impacts
of droughts, floods and irregular precipitation on agricultural
production and other ecosystem-based livelihoods [13, 26, 42,
102]. Migration is often leveraged as a critical livelihood di-
versification strategy by households in areas facing severe
climate change impacts [2, 85]. Recent studies have sought
to project climate-driven migration in South Asia using a suite
of modelling techniques [77]. However, this study seeks to
add to the growing body of empirical evidence [17, 23, 54,
55] by examining the composition, direction, and duration of
migration at regional level; the drivers and barriers to migra-
tion, and how they interact; and the linkages between migra-
tion and adaptation at household level [99]. The synthesis of
migration patterns presented here draws on empirical findings
from the Collaborative Adaptation Research Initiative in
Africa and Asia (CARIAA) programme, which aimed to in-
vestigate adaptation responses in three climate-sensitive
hotspots (deltas, semi-arid regions, and snowpack- or
glacier-fed river basins). As part of the programme’s objec-
tives, four CARIAA consortia employed a range of quantita-
tive and qualitative methodological approaches to investigate
the relationship between migration and adaptation in South
Asia.1
Drawing on novel empirical datasets, the research synthe-
sized in this paper contributes to the body of empirical knowl-
edge examining the relationship between migration and adap-
tation in South Asia in the context of climate change. It also
provides insights into how the implementation of a suite of
research methods is the key to understanding complex char-
acteristics of migration in climate-sensitive areas of
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan. The article is
organised as follows: the “Conceptual Links Between
Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation” section reviews
the links between migration and environmental change and
provides a brief literature review on previous research exam-
ining the relationship between migration and adaptation. The
“Methodology” section introduces the study areas, research
design, and methodological approach. The “Results” section
presents the findings for each study area focusing on the na-
ture of migration in each site and the implications of migration
for household adaptation. The “Conclusion” section
1 The four consortia were the Himalayan Adaptation, Water and Resilience
(HI-AWARE) Research on Glacier and Snowpack Dependent River Basins for
Improving Livelihoods; Adaptation at Scale in Semi-Arid Regions (ASSAR);
Pathways to Resilience in Semi-Arid Economies (PRISE); and Deltas,
Vulnerability and Climate Change: Migration and Adaptation (DECCMA).
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summarises the results, provide brief policy recommenda-
tions, and present future directions for research.
Conceptual Links Between Climate Change,
Migration and Adaptation
Migration is a key livelihood strategy that occurs across spa-
tiotemporal scales and can range from temporary moves to
permanent relocation [41]. Individuals and households re-
spond differently to the various drivers associated with migra-
tion depending on socioeconomic and cultural characteristics,
demographic composition, and their contextual setting [14].
Several types of migration—such as seasonal, circular and
permanent movement—are recognised as strategies to diver-
sify livelihoods in response to external shocks including inter-
national and national market adjustments in transition econo-
mies, development, conflict and the effects of climate change,
and other environmental hazards in ecosystem-based econo-
mies [31, 33, 105]. Early research framed migration decisions
as driven by aims to maximise individual profit and minimise
loss of household income associated with crop failure, vola-
tility of markets, or economic recession [88]. Recent studies
have nuanced this model to demonstrate that migration deci-
sions are a complex interplay of household capabilities (i.e.
composition, education levels, social networks), assets, per-
sonal aspirations, and external factors such as increased cli-
mate variability, livelihood opportunities, and access to towns
and cities [22, 26, 72, 85, 94].
Contemporary migration trends in South Asia continue to
suggest prevalence of migration driven by economic factors.
However, the pervasive effects of climate change could lead to
significant incremental or non-linear changes in migration
outcomes depending on the context [60, 61]. For example,
direct impact brought about by rapid onset hazards such as
cyclones and floods or indirect impacts associated with slow
onset events including drought and changes in annual mon-
soon regime [26, 102].
Research on migration associated with environmental
drivers has investigated the relationship between population
movement and the degree of exposure to and impact of haz-
ards on livelihoods, teasing out the way migration decisions
and outcomes vary between households and communities [37,
43, 59]. Underpinning this empirical work is substantial prog-
ress in conceptualising the relationship between climate
change and migration beyond direct causal factors such as
rapid onset disasters causing displacement. In effect, migra-
tion associated with cumulative environmental changes over
time is a multi-faceted phenomenon that is harder to isolate.
Slow onset events are likely to take place alongside economic,
social, and political changes [66]. As a result, it is difficult to
single out climate change as the main driver of migration. This
assessment corroborates the notion that environmental factors
alone do not destabilise human security [6]. Limited economic
development, the range of government support to communi-
ties, capacity to access credit and markets, social cohesion,
and political instability are equally important in migration
decision-making processes [19, 21].
As the impacts of climate change become more widely
recognised, researchers are increasingly examining how mi-
gration can contribute to climate change adaptation [3, 85,
99], independent of the reasons for migration. In the context
of climate change, adaptation is defined as the process of
adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects, which
seeks to minimise harm or exploit beneficial opportunities
[48]. Adaptation can be either autonomous or planned.
Autonomous adaptation is defined as ‘natural or spontaneous
adjustments in the face of a changing climate’ [20], whereas
planned adaptation requires conscious intervention [32]. The
IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report makes a strong case for the
capacity of migration outcomes to reduce vulnerability for
populations exposed to extreme events and longer term cli-
mate change [6].
Migration is often characterised as an effective adaptation
strategy (e.g. by spreading risk and diversifying incomes) [35,
93, 104]. On the other hand, it has been described as a failure
to adapt where populations being unable to respond to risk
migrate as a last option [6]. Between these two extremes of
the migration for adaptation debate are ideas of howmigration
drivers and outcomes are differentiated and it can denote ad-
aptation in certain situations and for certain people while sig-
nifying a failure to adapt for others [18, 85, 87, 103]. In fragile
environments, migration is a common response to vulnerabil-
ity to slow and rapid onset events [68, 104]. Gemenne and
Blocher [35] suggested that migration can affect adaptation
through three distinct vantage points, namely for the migrants
themselves, for the community of origin, and for the commu-
nity of destination and the combined communities of origin
and destination. Our study focuses on the migrants’ vantage
point, examining the characteristics of migrants as well as
social and cultural factors determining who migrates .
Migration can contribute to household adaptation mostly
through remittances—by improving existing resource bases of
individuals and households, spreading risk, and diversifying
income sources to reduce vulnerabilities [35, 93, 104].
Emerging empirical and theoretical research suggests that
the roles of remittances, skill acquisition, and transfer are par-
ticularly important in household adaptation [7, 66, 82]. In
vulnerable areas, migration and the resulting remittances can
build the adaptive capacities of the households, particularly
when adaption measures incur investments [69].
Furthermore, studies suggest that migration has the potential
to enhance household ability to absorb shocks [36, 96].
Contrastingly, migration has also been framed as a failure
to adapt or a maladaptive response [49].Migrationmay trigger
increased risk for those who move, those who are unable to
Curr Clim Change Rep (2020) 6:1–16 3
Springer 
move, and also for migrant destination areas [103]. The neg-
ative consequences of migration for poorer households fight-
ing to cope with a range of economic and material challenges
in the wake of environmental and climatic risks can be severe
[63]. The erosion of important assets (i.e. human capital)
could prove detrimental in the medium or longer term, reduc-
ing overall adaptive capacity, especially to households depen-
dent on ecosystem-based livelihoods [36, 85]. Furthermore, in
extreme cases, migration can manifest as a failure to adapt or
is employed as a last-resort response after other coping strat-
egies have failed [73, 76].
Figure 1 illustrates how climatic drivers (both slow and
rapid onset, e.g. floods, rainfall variability) interact with
non-climatic drivers (e.g. existing poverty, conflict, develop-
ment deficits) to influence household migration decisions.
These decisions to move or stay have implications on house-
hold adaptive capacity through remittances, changes in human
and social capital, etc., accruing to influence household adap-
tation. When households are exposed to climate change im-
pacts, they assess the constraints and opportunities created by
sending one or more members to work outside the village
(thereby increased or reduced vulnerability), stay and adapt
in situ (reduced vulnerability), and stay without adapting (in-
creased vulnerability). These decisions are capital endowment
of the household. For migrant households, the capacity to
adapt is then dependent on the remittances (both financial
and social) received and the ability to overcome loss of labour
and social capital. For non-migrant households, the capacity
to adapt is dependent on their financial, human, and social
capitals.
In the literature, there remain gaps around the implications
of migration for adaptation, especially in climate hotspots.
Studies have typically modelled climate change and migration
patterns to estimate ‘climate migrants’ (e.g. [77]) or ascertain
climatic drivers of migration (e.g. [26]). In this paper, we add
to this literature empirically by providing a bottom-up assess-
ment of migration patterns and decision-making [24]. In doing
so, we also contribute conceptually to understanding the im-




The study areas are located in environmentally vulnerable
regions, characterised by high resource competition and deg-
radation, and a history of exposure to extreme events. The
effects of climate change are expected to be higher in the study
sites as compared with global average [24]. The study areas in
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, and Pakistan were selected accord-
ing to three criteria: (1) each individual site was located in a
country that had been regularly affected by extreme events
and was also vulnerable to future climate change [28, 53];
(2) each represented a different climate hotspot where migra-
tion is an important livelihood strategy for the households—
we chose deltas, river basins, and semi-arid environments
experiencing multiple stressors ([71, 91]); and (3) in the case
of deltas, sampled locations were selected among migration-
sending areas with a well-documented history of rural to urban
population movements [92].
The illustrative map (Fig. 2) provides the location and main
environmental stressors in the study areas. HI-AWARE study
sites covered mountain-based hotspots, i.e. four glacier- and
snowmelt-dependent river basins in India, Pakistan, and
Nepal, covering the Indus, Upper Ganga, Gandaki, and
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Fig. 1 A conceptual framework
of migration for adaptation under
climate change impacts
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selected to represent up-mid-down-stream areas. DECCMA
study sites included deltaic hotspots in the Ganges–
Brahmaputra–Meghna (GBM) delta in Bangladesh and
India, and the Mahanadi delta in India. It is important to note
that the Indian portion of the GBM delta is known as the
Indian Bengal delta (IBD) and the area located within
Bangladesh is known as the Bangladesh GBM delta. In the
Mahanadi delta, the study sites were distributed in five dis-
tricts. In the IBD, study locations were North 24 Parganas and
South 24 Parganas, both districts of West Bengal. Lastly, in
the Bangladesh GBM, the sites were spread across 14 districts.
PRISE study sites in Pakistan were spread across three dis-
tricts (D.G. Khan and Faisalabad districts of the Punjab prov-
ince and Mardan district of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)
province) and denoted migration in semi-arid plains. In
ASSAR, migration was studied along a rural–urban continu-
um in Karnataka state, south India, denoting semi-arid
plateaus as climate hotspots. Migration patterns from 17 vil-
lages in Kalaburgi and Kolar districts, 16 peri-urban villages
located in the larger Bengaluru Metropolitan Region (BMR),
and 31 settlements in Bangalore city were studied.
Data Collection
Primary data across all four study areas were collected during
January 2016–September 2017 through a suite of methodo-
logical approaches including cross-sectional household sur-
veys that enabled quantifiable and comparable data collection
and qualitative life history interviews [24]. The rationale for
site selection and sampling approach varied across the four
research consortia; however, each consortium focused on cap-
turing the migration profile of household members and the
relationship between migration and climate change adapta-
tion. Migration was no only defined as a period of absence
Fig. 2 Location of study hotspots and sites. ASSAR, Adaptation at Scale
in Semi-Arid Regions (semi-arid plateau); DECCMA, Deltas,
Vulnerability and Climate Change: Migration and Adaptation (deltas);
HI-AWARE, Himalayan Adaptation, Water and Resilience (river
basins); PRISE, Pathways to Resilience in Semi-Arid Economies (semi-
arid plains)
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of one or more household members for at least 3 months in the
year before the survey but also include migration events of
longer duration (> 6 months). A household was classified as
migrant household if it had at least one migrant member. The
surveys included socioeconomic and demographic indicators
as well as comprehensive sections on climate change and its
impact, migration drivers, and decision-making and adapta-
tion. In total, 9440 households including migrant and non-
migrant households were surveyed across all research areas
(2725 households in semi-arid plateaus, 600 in semi-arid
plains, 1987 in river basins, and 4115 households in deltas).
In deltas, fifty locations in each study area were selected
followed a two-stage cluster sampling design. The first stage
of stratification created multi-hazard maps which divided the
study areas into five hazard zones (very low, low, medium,
high, very high) based on normalizing the hazard score and
dividing into quintiles. Each cluster of households in the study
area was assigned one of five hazard categories based on the
modal risk category. For each multi-hazard zone, the number
of clusters was selected proportional to the number of clusters
in that zone. Once clusters had been selected, a household
listing allowed randomized sampling.
In semi-arid plateaus, within the chosen districts, blocks
were chosen purposively based on repeated scoping visits,
secondary data analysis to ascertain migration patterns, land
use change, and livelihood shifts. Within each block, house-
holds were selected using stratified random sampling and
questionnaires conducted with household heads. The quanti-
tative surveys were supplemented with detailed village-level
settlement histories, gender differentiated Focus Group
Discussions (two/settlement), and life history interviews (see
[86] for details).
In the river basins, the study area consists of four river
basins: the Indus, Upper Ganga, Gandaki, and Teesta. To en-
sure the representation of different altitudes in the study area,
study sites from up-, mid-, and down-stream areas of all rivers
basins were included in this study. The study follows a strat-
ified sampling design. In each stratum, districts, study settle-
ments within districts, and households were selected random-
ly. Similarly, in semi-arid plains, a stratified random sampling
technique was used to collect data from rural areas of three
semi-arid districts of Pakistan. The whole sample was strati-
fied into four livelihood categories of households; small-
landholders (with less than 12.5 acres of land), large land-
holders (with more than 12.5 acres of land), and non-farm
households. To cover the qualitative aspect, 12 gender sensi-
tive focus group discussions (FGDs) were also conducted.
Questionnaires for each site were designed independently
to address the context-specific research questions in each area.
However, all four surveys derive and generate knowledge
based on people’s understandings and perceptions of changing
climatic conditions as the starting point, and locate migration
within a broader array of adaptation responses. The
quantitative nature of each survey instrument allowed us to
compare answers to questions that were similar across all four
hotspots. However, there are two important limitation of our
study—(i) sample size, despite being large, is not representa-
tive; therefore, the interpretation of findings beyond the study
sites should be done with caution, and (ii) all four surveys
were one time cross-sectional questionnaires and do not cap-
ture temporal dynamics of migration. However, the questions
framed in the questionnaire comparing the present situation
with past situations and the qualitative inquiries havemanaged
to capture some longitudinal trends.
Results
Migration and Remittance Profile
Who Migrates?
Across the four hotspots, most migrants were married young
men of 21–30 years with secondary or higher education levels
(Table 1). This is consistent with migration literature suggest-
ing that older men are less inclined to migrate and educated
younger men with limited access to resources and input into
household decision processes are more likely to do so [11, 43,
75, 77]. The gender balance in outflows from the study
hotspots suggested that household migration remained male
dominated. Previous studies have established that gender is an
important form of social differentiation that influences migra-
tion in developing countries [15].Migration requires sociocul-
tural acceptance, and economic and physical capacities that
are not equally available to women [10, 50]. However, there is
diversity in female migration across the study hotpots and
sites within the hotspots, with some sites reporting higher
proportion than others. For instance, the mountain areas in
the Gandaki and Teesta river basins, the Kendrapara and
Bhadrak districts of Mahanadi deltas in India, and the
Barisal and Khulna divisions of the GBM deltas in
Bangladesh reported higher female migration rates. The rea-
son for higher female migration in high mountain areas was
the sociocultural acceptance of migration by women, coupled
with a comparatively higher education attainment. Many re-
spondents reported better job opportunities and opportunity to
pursue further education as the major reason for migration of
women. Social norms in high mountain areas are more liberal
as compared with stringent patriarchal system followed in the
plains. Furthermore, in high mountains, environmental condi-
tions necessitate multi-local livelihoods with established fa-
milial and friendship networks in destinations. This social
norm makes the acceptance of women’s mobility easier. In
deltas, destruction of local livelihoods and existential threat
from a number of extreme climate events was reported as the
major driver for women to migrate. The study areas
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experienced significant losses and increased household vul-
nerability from cyclones Sidr 2007, Aila 2009 and Phailin
2014.
Where Do People Migrate and the Role of Remittances
Consistent with national statistics and other studies [36, 41,
77, 104], migration was predominantly internal across the four
study hotspots. The prevalent types of movements were daily
commuting from peri-urban to urban areas, seasonal/circular
migration (< 6 months/year) and long-term migration (>
6 months). International migration was high in certain study
sites such as the Gandaki river basin (Nepal), GBM delta in
Bangladesh, and Faisalabad district in the semi-arid plains of
Pakistan. Among international migrations, the most popular
destinations were the oil-rich Gulf countries and Malaysia.
This finding is consistent with that of Siddiqui et al. [83]’s
assessment in the Hindu Kush Himalayan region. Most mi-
grants worked in informal sectors, usually hired as daily wage
labourers in industries such as construction or small-scale re-
tail and hospitality.
Migration affected both origin and destination areas
through remittances—financial and social. Remittances, it is
argued, can provide flexibility in livelihood options, supply
capital for investment, and spread risk [89]. Across our four
study hotspots, 80% of migrant households reported receiving
remittances (slightly lower in deltas, where 66% of respon-
dents reported receiving remittances). Certain regional
differences were observed in deltas. For example, only 48%
of households reported receiving remittances in the Mahanadi
delta in India against 85% in GBM in Bangladesh. This lower
remittance transfer in deltas was associated with a short dura-
tion of migration. For example, 82% of migrants in Mahanadi
delta moved for less than 6 months, and carried remittance in
cash and kind in person. Overall, the average annual remit-
tances from internal migration (USD 543) were much lower
than those recorded for international migration (USD 1703) in
the study sites.
Remittances have the potential to enable rural households
to overcome credit and risk constraints by the spatial diversi-
fication of labour and income [90]. Moreover, if invested in
modern agricultural technologies, tools and livestock, subsis-
tence farmers can increase their productivity and complete the
transition from familial to commercial production, which is
instrumental in the diversification of rural economies [9, 62].
It is the capacity to mobilise new resources that can enhance
household resilience against the pervasive effects of climate
change. However, our empirical evidence suggested that
across the four study hotspots, remittances were scantly
employed to enhance asset base or invest in income-
generating activities locally. For example, in the deltas and
semi-arid plains, 89% of surveyed households used remittance
income to help pay for food, health, education, debt repay-
ment, and household appliances. Consistent with other studies
[34, 56], our empirical evidence suggested that remittances
acted as a financial buffer against economic losses, thus
Table 1 Profile of migrants in the
study hotspots (in percentage) Features Semi-arid plateau Semi-arid plains Deltas
Sex
Male 73.6 91.7 83.9
Female 26.4 8.3 16.0
Formal education
Illiterate 34.1 10.1 6.5
1–6 years of school 17.2 10.7 10.8
7–9 years of school 8.7 15.4 13.8
10 years of school and above 47.9 63.8 68.7
Age group
20 years and below 4.0 22.4 22.4
21–30 years 43.0 46.4 39.4
31–40 years 23.9 21.3 23.5
41–50 years 16.4 6.4 10.8
50+ years 12.4 3.6 3.6
Marital status
Single 26.7 48.6 43.5
Married 73.3 50.8 55.1
Separated - 0.3 0.3
Widowed - 0.3 1.0
In river basins (HI-AWARE) household surveys, intra-household data were not collected
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representing reactive (albeit powerful) coping mechanisms
during hardships. In the river basins, 17% of households re-
ported using remittances to meet household food and non-
food needs during hardship brought about by extreme envi-
ronmental events.
In addition to financial remittances, migration brought so-
cial remittances such as new ideas, knowledge, skills and
technologies from destination to origin areas for development
in the areas of origin [9, 57]. Empirical evidence across all
four study hotspots supported this theory. In deltas, 75% of
surveyed households reported benefits from new ideas and
knowledge to build adaptive capacities at origin. Similarly,
29% of migrant households in semi-arid plains reported learn-
ing new knowledge and skills compared to 20% of non-
migrant households. The difference was statistically signifi-
cant at 5% level of significance. Similarly, labour migrants
from semi-arid regions and deltas acquired new skills such
as masonry, carpentry, and catering at their destination. As a
result, migrants were able to diversify their livelihoods upon
returning to place of origin. In the Upper Ganga areas mi-
grants had introduced mobile apps to the communities.
These apps provided weather-related information, allowing
daily agricultural activities to be planned.
Why Do People Migrate?
Consistent with previous findings on motivations for migra-
tion [36, 41, 77, 104], the main driver of migration as reported
by migrants across the four study hotspots was economic,
often associated with better employment opportunities else-
where. When asked ‘What was the primary reason for migrat-
ing?’ 55% of respondents in semi-arid plateau, 82% in semi-
arid plains, 48% in deltas, and 44% in river basins reported
economic reason as the primary reason. Other important rea-
sons reported were to pursue higher education, meet family
obligations, diversify from unprofitable agriculture, earn bet-
ter wages, overcome landlessness, and moving for marriage.
These responses revealed that unequal development, leading
to lack of economic opportunities and access to basic services,
was a major driver for people to move from rural areas to
urban areas.
Only 6% of the respondents in deltas and 12% in semi-arid
plains cited environmental causes such as drought, flood, cy-
clones, increased temperature, and erratic rainfall as their main
motivation for migration. This result highlighted that, in most
cases, households did not identify migration of a household
member as being related to the environment. It illustrated,
rather, that decisions to migrate were multi-causal, in which
economic reasons were the primary motivation. Consistent
with previous findings [1, 101], environmental drivers had
weak attribution in the migration decisions in the study sites.
The discrete research designs employed in this study had cer-
tain limitations which inhibited the capture of environmental
attributes to migration. As previous studies suggest, it is dif-
ficult to measure the relative significance of environmental
factors vis-á-vis other drivers in labour migration [14]. This
was particularly true in cases where empirical evidence was
collected via cross-sectional surveys in sending areas. Direct
causal signals are stronger in displacement or permanent relo-
cation following sudden-onset environmental hazards.
However, recently emerging literature with methodology to
capture household’s perceptions regarding climate change
and household migration decision paves new ways to investi-
gate this linkage [54, 55].
Barriers to Migration
Across the four study hotspots, migration was not always
available to households exposed to environmental stressors.
The proportion of households that reported migration of one
or more members was only 29% in the river basins, 41% in
semi-arid plains, 39% in semi-arid plateaus, and 24% in
deltas. There were several barriers to migration.
Sociocultural norms, household composition, and intra-
household work sharing norms made migration a highly gen-
dered process, typically curtailing women migrating [46]. In
the study hotspots, lack of financial capital and social network
in destination were the most prevalent barriers. In case of
Pakistan (Indus river basin and semi-arid plains), having suf-
ficient male adults in the household to send for migration was
reported as another important barrier. Lack of access to safe
accommodation in destination areas and constant preoccupa-
tion about maintaining family commitments in places of origin
were reported as significant constraints preventing women
migration during the focus group discussion in Bangladesh
deltas. Marital status was also highlighted by respondents,
with married women enjoying more autonomy to migrate
compared with single women.
The barriers discussed above have limited migration as a
response to climate change in the study areas. Many surveyed
respondents mentioned the desire to diversify their income
sources by adding migration into their livelihood portfolio.
In the semi-arid plains and deltas, for example, the proportion
of immobile households was 59% and 35%, respectively.
Migration for Household Adaptation
There is a growing body of literature on climate change adap-
tation and its effect on reducing vulnerability to climate
change impacts at household levels [27, 70]. Research en-
deavours in measuring adaptation have focused heavily on
assessing the vulnerability or adaptive capacity through vari-
ous indices [38, 45]. But linking migration to adaptation out-
comes is complex with changes over temporal and spatial
dimensions being critical [35, 64, 104]. The research analysis
conducted by the four CARIAA consortia employed a suite of
Curr Clim Change Rep (2020) 6:1–168
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analytical tools to examine this relationship in the study
hotspots. HI-AWARE examines the adaptation behaviour of
the households, DECCMA analyses the differences in adap-
tation measures of households, PRISE assesses the difference
in livelihood resilience of the households, and ASSAR exam-
ines changes in the material and subjective well-being of mi-
grant households. Each analytical tool offers a different lens in
the migration and household adaptation interlinkages. While
the different analytical tools employed make it challenging to
compare the results directly across the hotspots, we report the
key findings on the implications of migration for household
adaptation and attempt to synthesize them. In each section, we
briefly describe data and analysis techniques employed in
each study hotspot followed by key findings. We highlight
that in this synthesis report, we present findings derived from
both quantitative and qualitative data and analytical
techniques.
River Basins
In the river basins, we examined the adaptation behaviour of
households to climate change impacts separated by migration
status (migrant and non-migrant households) of the household
in four crucial livelihoods sectors—agriculture, livestock, wa-
ter, and forest. Households were classified as adaptors or non-
adaptors—adaptors were households that had reported under-
taking at least one measure to reduce the negative impacts of
climate change in the particular sector in the year prior to the
data collection. A household was categorised as migrant if it
had at least one member involved in labour migration for at
least 3 months in the year prior to the data collection. The
statistical relationship between adaption behaviour and migra-
tion status was tested using Pearson chi-square test of inde-
pendence in the four livelihood sectors. Test results showed
that in agriculture sector, migration played a statistically sig-
nificant role in adaption behaviour of households (Table 2). In
other sectors, the differences were statistically not significant.
For majority of the households in the study sites, agriculture
was a major economic sector and households depended on
farm production to meet their food security. This probably
explains the reason for migrant households’ investment on
adaptation measures in agriculture sector. The most common-
ly used adaptation measures in agriculture were introduction
of new crop varieties, use of pesticide/insecticides, adjustment
of timing, improved irrigation, shifting to non-farm activities,
etc.
Although more than 90% of households perceived changes
in climate as compared with situations a decade before, less
than one-third of the households reported undertaking adapta-
tion measures to reduce the negative impacts of such changes.
Overall, higher proportion of households reported undertaking
at least one adaptation measure in agriculture and water sector
and least in forest sector. Consistent with findings of Hussain
et al. [44] in the Koshi river basin, most of the adaptation
measures undertaken by households were autonomous rather
than planned. This illustrates the importance of identifying
and verifying the autonomous local adaptation practices; how-
ever, they might be unable to manage new risks and extreme
changes in future [65].
Deltas
The analytical approach in deltas was two-pronged, examin-
ing (1) who were migrating as an adaptation response to cli-
mate change (assessed through exposure to floods, droughts,
sea level rise, erosion, and salinity), and whether or not they
deemed that to be a successful adaptation; and (2) differences
in adaptation measures adopted by migrant and non-migrant
households using Chi-square tests to see if there were statisti-
cally significant differences.
Migration was an adaptation response in all three deltas: by
28% of households in Bangladesh; 53.3% in the Indian
Bengal delta; and 23% in the Mahanadi. Interestingly, though,
migration was not among the top three strategies considered
successful adaptations in any of the deltas. Temporary mobil-
ity associated with production-related moves was also cap-
tured in the survey by way of people reporting work outside
the village. Such an adaptation response was mentioned wide-
ly by between 51 and 71% of respondents across the three
deltas.
Table 3 shows results for the most prevalent adaptation
responses. The statistically significant differences between
migrant and non-migrant households relate to the use of ad-
aptations that were finance-related. In terms of increasing in-
come to the household, more migrant households took loans
in the Indian Bengal, Mahanadi, and the Bangladesh portion
of the GBM deltas. This may have been because remittances
could act as a guarantee for such loans. Migrant households
Table 2 Household reporting
adaptation to climate change by
migration status
Sector Non-migrant households Migrant households p values for Pearson Chi2 test
Agriculture 28 32 0.033**
Livestock 16 15 0.630
Forest 7 8 0.454
Water 36 34 0.346
**Significant levels at 5% levels for chi-square test
Curr Clim Change Rep (2020) 6:1–16 9
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also adapted by modifying their homes: for example, by con-
structing more permanent structures that better withstood
flooding and cyclones. This was an important adaptation in
deltas, and qualitative interviews in the Indian Bengal delta
indicated that this was one of the primary priorities of
households.
In Bangladesh, however, it is important to note that there
was only a marginal (statistically insignificant) difference be-
tween migrant and non-migrant households in terms of taking
out loans. This was likely to have been because of widespread
household access to microfinance. Bangladesh has been a pi-
oneer in microfinance operations since 1980 [52]. Work out-
side the village was the only adaptation response that recorded
statistically significant differences across the three deltas.
Although the survey did not capture the type of mobility as-
sociatedwith that answer, there was a wide range of temporary
moves including daily, weekly, and circular trips. In practice,
that underpins the livelihoods of people worldwide, and this is
particularly the case for smallholder and subsistence farmers
living in marginal environmental conditions. Such move-
ments occur for a wide range of reasons including labour
and economic motivations.
In contrast, there was no statistically significant difference
between migrant and non-migrant households in the use of
livelihood-based adaptations, for example diversifying crops;
planting climate-tolerant crops; increasing use of irrigation; or
using new farming and fishing equipment in the Indian
Bengal, Mahanadi, and Bangladesh deltas.
Semi-arid Plains
The approach in the semi-arid plains sought to understand the
relationship between migration and resilience by using a live-
lihood resilience index. The study defines livelihood resil-
ience as ‘the capacity of all people across generations to sus-
tain and improve their livelihood opportunities and wellbeing
despite environmental, economic, social and political distur-
bances’ [95]. The resilience index was constructed following
the method developed by Cutter et al. [25]. Livelihood resil-
ience index is composed of three components: adaptive, ab-
sorptive, and anticipatory capacity. Following Bahadur et al.
[8], adaptive capacity is defined as the ability of social system
to adapt to multiple, long-term, and future climate change
risks, and also to learn and adjust after a disaster, Similarly,
anticipatory capacity as the ability of social systems to antic-
ipate and reduce the impact of climate variability extremes
through preparedness and planning capacities, and absorptive
capacity as the ability of social systems to absorb and cope
with the impacts of climate variability and extremes. Each
component is further divided into sub-components (see
Bahadur et al. [8] for detail). Indicators defining the three
types of capacities were selected through a careful literature
review and customised to match the local context of the study
areas.
We found that overall migrant households were more resil-
ient than non-migrant households and they scored better than
non-migrant households in all the three components (Fig. 3).
They had greater adaptability to shocks as a result of higher
and more diversified income sources, better housing, and a
higher employment rate. Migrant households also had higher
levels of subjective well-being, as they were more comfortable
in coping with stressors, more at ease in making life decisions
and were exposed to a wider range of opportunities to learn
new skills and improve their livelihoods. They were also more
adept at planning for the future, more informed about climate
change impacts, and had higher capacities to anticipate and
deal with shocks such as climate extremes and food insecurity
[78].
Semi-arid Plateau
In the semi-arid plateau sites, in addition to the household
surveys, life history interviews (n = 37 across rural, peri-ur-
ban, and urban sites) were used to examine temporal vulner-
ability and changes in the material and subjective well-being
of migrant households across the rural–urban continuum [84,
85]. These life histories were supplemented by historical time-
lines to reconstruct local ecological, socioeconomic, and
politico-institutional changes, and consequent livelihood dy-
namics. The in-depth life histories analysed ‘family trajecto-
ries of accumulation or impoverishment over time and of par-
ticular matrices of vulnerability’ ([67]: 489) and thus
Table 3 Most prevalent







IBD MD BD IBD MD BD IBD MD BD
Taking out a loan 47.2 43.5 70.2 63.6 51.0 72.5 0.001*** 0.020* 0.375
Modifications to
the house
39.9 33.2 60.3 51.7 41.3 62.6 0.001*** 0.008** 0.423
Work outside
the village
8.2 16.0 5.0 61.0 51.6 71.6 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
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constructed an understanding around temporal vulnerability
and how households followed ‘(household) trajectories to-
wards vulnerability or resilience’ ([79]: 3). These narratives
also allowed a nuanced inquiry into how personal and family
aspirations, asset constraints, and needs interacted with social
norms, agency, and larger-scale institutional and economic
changes to shape livelihood choices [86].
Migrant life histories demonstrated that permanent migra-
tion, especially accompanied by accumulation of education,
skills, and social capital can, over a period of time, be a pos-
itive adaptive response, expressed through increased incomes,
better living facilities, improved access to services, and lower
exposure to extreme events as compared with where they
moved from [85]. However, we also found instances where
permanent migration was also detrimental, especially when
there was inadequate employment or poor living conditions
associated with tenure insecurity in destination areas, entering
into unsafe livelihoods, or living in flood-prone areas in the
cities they moved to [63]. Critically, the life histories demon-
strated that the outcomes of migration decisions change over
time with some houses improving their assets and capabilities
and hence adaptive capacities while others (typically those
with poor social networks, low assets, and belonging to mar-
ginalized social groups) remaining trapped in cycles of cop-
ing. Furthermore, migration outcomes were differentiated
within the household, with men and women within migrating
household reporting differential impacts on well-being. In
keeping with previous research (e.g. [12]), women reported
higher work burdens and reduced time for leisure once they
moved. However, there were also examples contradicting per-
ceptions of gendered migration: in peri-urban areas, women
reported migration improving subjective well-being and adap-
tive capacities through improved incomes, more autonomy,
and changing intra-household gender relations [74].
Discussion
To test the implications of migration for adaptation, this study
assessed the role of financial remittances as an indicator of
enhanced resilience and well-being. Literature on migration
and development is rich with insights about how remittances
support households facing environmental shocks [5, 81]. Our
findings suggest that migration enhanced household adapta-
tion (e.g. in river basins) and livelihood resilience (e.g. in
semi-arid plains), thus fulfilling the potential to be a strategy
to move households from a position of vulnerability to en-
hanced resilience (e.g. in semi-arid plateau). Remittances were
an important factor in assessing migration outcomes for cli-
mate change adaptation. When mainly used by households to
meet basic needs, such as food and non-food consumption,
remittances support coping with climate stressors, suggesting
that migration is a shot-term response strategy. On the other
hand, when remittances are used to build household assets,
Fig. 3 Resilience index scores by household migration status in semi-arid regions of Pakistan
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leading to long-term sustainability, migration can be a path-
way to successful adaptation to the adverse effects of climate-
related hazards [104].
In general, across the four hotspots examined in this study,
financial remittances were small and mostly used to meet
household food consumption, with limited investment or in-
crease in asset base. However, our findings from the deltas and
semi-arid plains showed that migration can contribute to an
overall increase in household income (e.g. access to loan,
using remittance as a guarantee). The additional increased
income (both loan and remittances) was then used to enhance
household resilience, for example through improvements in
house infrastructure. Thus, we suggest that, at present, migra-
tion represents a form of response to climate change rather
than a long-term adaptation strategy. This is also reflected in
the self-assessment of migration as an adaptation strategy by
the delta households themselves.
When seen through the lens of well-being (material and
subjective) as done in the semi-arid plateaus, migration was
found to improve material well-being (e.g. through higher
incomes) but dampen subjective well-being (e.g. lower social
capital in destination areas, feelings of alienation and insecu-
rity, lesser leisure, especially for women) [75, 85–87]. These
findings demonstrate that while remittances help migrating
households and can have adaptation co-benefits, moving en-
tails other intangible costs which can in certain conditions
increase vulnerability and at other times improve adaptive
capacity.
By employing different methodological approaches to as-
sess migration and adaptation linkages, we were able to un-
pack the complex ways in which migration influence house-
hold adaptation in climate hotspots. Overall, our study find-
ings provides a strong evidence that irrespective of reason for
migration, labour migration can positively contribute to the
household adaptation to climate change impacts. Migration
can contribute positively to household adaptation capacity,
provided there is policy support to improve the overall out-
comes of migration and more planned adaptation locally (Fig.
4). Migration outcomes can be improved by building the hu-
man capital of migrants (skills, health, education), reducing
cost of migration and remittance transfer, and improving safe-
ty nets for migrants at destination [40].
While there may be economic benefits of migration in
terms of remittances, we cannot overlook their social costs
in terms of the splitting up of families. Permanent relocation
or temporary migration, such as household members working
outside the village, typically occurred to generate more in-
come. This meant that migrant households increased their fi-
nancial capital, which could be substituted for other forms of
capital (such as physical capital in the case of modifications to
the house) which enabled better adaptation. However, inter-
views with migrants and migrant households across the study
hotspots highlighted the negative effects of splitting up fami-
lies (e.g. marriage breakdown and poor performance of chil-
dren in school). As most migrants were men, there was an
increase in the responsibility and labour burden for women
left behind. Women were de facto responsible for all house-
hold and field work, but with limited capacities to undertake
these new roles. This represents an important research dimen-
sion for future consideration, with important implications for
adaptation policy and planning.
Conclusion
Analysing novel large empirical datasets in climate hotspots
across Nepal, India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, this paper con-
tributes to the empirical evidence on migration and climate
change adaptation. The study argues that migration is an im-
portant livelihood strategy as a response to various stressors,
including climatic risks such as higher rainfall variability, cy-
clones, storm surges, and drought, and non-climatic factors
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Fig. 4 Migration pathway from coping to adaptation strategy
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such as changing aspirations, economic recessions, and re-
gional underdevelopment. Households with available re-
sources send one or more members (often young men) for
labour migration, to diversify livelihoods. In return, migrants
send home remittances that help to spatially diversify house-
hold income and improve access to credit. This helps spread
risks and self-insure against the effects of climate change and
other non-climatic risks. However, migration is not a strategy
that is available to everyone because of various barriers such
as sociocultural norms and financial capacities (“Barriers to
migration” section). This inhibits the migration capacity of
women and historically marginalised households (e.g. on the
basis of caste, ethnicity).
Our findings suggest that households in vulnerable
areas use migration as a strategy to cope with the adverse
effects of climate change and non-climatic risks.
However, it is important to stress that migration entails
risks for individuals and households. Without achieving
positive outcomes that increase the resilience of house-
holds or effectively increasing vulnerability of the migrant
at destination migration can be an erosive adaptation strat-
egy. Thus, we argue that there is a need for policy and
institutional coherence and collaboration to account for
the contributions of migration in adapting to climate
change. It is important for institutions responsible for
the design and implementation of policies addressing cli-
mate change and migration issues to have a comprehen-
sive understanding of how migration and adaptation inter-
act, and ultimately to develop migration as a successful
adaptation strategy. Lastly, the burden of adapting to the
adverse effects of climate change should not lie on the
shoulders of migrants. Governments should take the re-
sponsibility for building the adaptive capacity of people,
and migration could be one of the options.
We identified two important issues that could be addressed
by future research: (1) this study did not capture migration of
entire households from the origin areas, and (2) involuntary
permanently displaced individuals and households, as well as
planned relocation initiatives directly attributed to extreme
rapid onset climatic events were also not considered. These
are important categories of population movements with impli-
cations for both material and subjective well-being of individ-
uals and households which deserve careful consideration by
both researchers and practitioners.
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